1. Introduction

Luigi Einaudi is renowned for his contributions to economics, journalism, and political life. Less widely known, however, is his role as a committed pro-European and one of the foremost federalist thinkers of the 20th century. Einaudi authored a series of groundbreaking essays on themes such as peace, the crisis of the nation-state, and the unification of Europe. His influence on the federalist movement is underscored by Altiero Spinelli’s acknowledgment that Einaudi’s writings—most notably Lettere politiche di Junius, reprinted by Laterza in 1920—helped shape the ideas of the Ventotene Manifesto’s authors in the late 1930s. This manifesto would later become a cornerstone of modern federalist thought. Einaudi’s contributions to the discourse on European unity span over a half-century, from 1897 to 1956. This prolific period was punctuated by a hiatus between 1925 and 1940, a result of his decision to cease collaborating with Corriere della Sera in solidarity with its editor, Luigi Albertini, who had resigned following the newspaper’s fascist alignment. Einaudi returned to the subject in 1940, once again addressing issues of peace and European unification. His writings are particularly concentrated during two critical junctures in 20th-century history: 1915–1925 and 1943–1954. These years encompassed the world wars, the post-war crises, the founding of the League of Nations, the process of reconstruction, and the early stages of European integration. Einaudi’s essays are scattered across various publications, often brief, topical, and rigorous without being overly academic. Predominantly published in newspapers, they were crafted to educate the public and encourage readers to look beyond surface appearances. Collectively, these writings amount to several hundred pages. Notable among his contributions are his examinations of the crisis of the sovereign state, his distinction between federation and confederation, his critiques of the League of Nations and the United Nations, his identification of the underlying causes of global conflicts, as well as his insights into the origins of war and strategies for ensuring peace, the doctrine of the federal state and presented a pointed critique of functionalism.

2. Against the Myth of the Sovereign State

The crisis of the sovereign state is not merely an empirical phenomenon for federalist thought; it is also a pivotal historiographic category of an invaluable heuristic value for critical insights in order to understand the history of the 20th century, the origins of the two world wars, the rise of fascism, and the main drive for the process of European European—and potentially global—integration. This is a cornerstone of Luigi Einaudi’s intellectual framework. Einaudi resolutely challenged the dogma of absolute sovereignty, juxtaposing it with the necessity for cooperation dictated by the growing reality of interdependence. His analysis is rooted in the economic transformations brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Absolute sovereignty, understood as complete independence from external entities, necessitates economic self-sufficiency and therefore a living space available. The theory of living spaces seen as a solution to raw material scarcity and to surplus production, rests on the erroneous assumption that economic self-sufficiency is achievable within each individual “living space.” In an era defined by interdependence, the entire globe constitutes the living space, as no economic entity—regardless of its size—possesses all the raw materials essential for its development. Even the expanded territory will face resource shortages that can only be found in remote regions. Thus, the pretended pursuit of absolute sovereignty and territorial expansion inexorably leads to the logic of global domination—and ultimately, to war.

The Industrial Revolution, along with the subsequent socio-economic and scientific advancements, initiated a process of global interdependence. This development favoured the emergence of large states in the early 19th century, such as the United States, Russia, and the British Empire, while consigning the smaller European nations to marginalisation and irrelevance. Einaudi argued that these European countries, diminished to mere pygmies on the global stage, possessed territories too small and domestic markets too constrained to sustain an effective division of labour or enable businesses to achieve optimal scale. His conclusion is unequivocal: “The dogma of perfect sovereignty must be destroyed and banished forever. The truth is interdependence, not the sovereignty of states. The truth is the connection between free peoples, not their absolute independence.” This perspective is elaborated in his works, Il dogma della sovranità e l’idea della Società delle Nazioni (The Dogma of Sovereignty and the Idea of the League of Nations) and Per una nuova Europa. La federazione dei popoli contro il mito dello stato sovrano (For a New Europe: The Federation of Peoples Against the Myth of the Sovereign State).

Einaudi identified four key implications arising from the rejection of the sovereign state dogma: the affirmation of the right to intervene in the affairs of other states; the identification of absolute sovereignty as the ultimate cause of war; a critique of the League of Nations and the United Nations and the necessity of establishing a European federation.

3. The Right to Intervene

Einaudi’s critique of the myth of absolute sovereignty leads directly to the assertion that interference in the internal affairs of another state is not merely a right but, under certain conditions, an obligation. The doctrine of non-intervention, he argues, stems from the outdated premise of absolute state sovereignty. However, the realities of growing global interdependence have rendered the distinction between external and internal affairs increasingly obsolete. Einaudi posed a fundamental question: should modern societies continue to be organised into sovereign states, or should nations accept the intervention of others in their domestic matters? The answer, for Einaudi, is unequivocal. If the sovereignty of the state has been effectively undermined by interdependence, then the doctrine of non-intervention must also be abandoned. Clinging to this principle demonstrates a failure to grasp the lessons of the two world wars, both of which were fought in opposition to the idea of non-intervention. According to Einaudi, the Allies waged war to establish the duty—he is explicit in framing it as a duty, not merely a right—to intervene in the domestic affairs of states whose regimes posed a persistent threat to their existence and to uphold the principle that tyrannical regimes are intolerable anywhere in the world. The existence of a dictatorship affects not only the citizens subjected to it but also every other nation, as such regimes represent a contagion threatening global stability. This is a clear foreshadowing the "right to intervene”, of the obligation for the United Nations to act in defence of peace and democracy.

4. The Ultimate Cause of War

Einaudi's pacifism aligns with the tradition of legal pacifism rooted in the thought of Kant and intertwined with the federalist tradition inspired by Hamilton. According to this perspective, the ultimate cause of war cannot be attributed solely to the internal structure of states or to specific political or economic factors, which may explain individual conflicts but not the underlying possibility of warfare. For Einaudi, the mere cause of war lies in the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty, the absence of a higher governing authority, and the resultant international anarchy. In such a system, without a superior and impartial arbiter, disputes cannot be resolved peacefully. Only a federation—a political entity that establishes a higher state authority—can ensure enduring peace (see The Theory of Non-Intervention). Einaudi revisited this topic in 1948 through two articles published in Corriere della Sera that addressed urgent contemporary issues: Chi vuole la bomba atomica? ("Who Wants the Atomic Bomb?") and Chi vuole la pace? ("Who Wants Peace?"). He argued that the debate on the atomic bomb was not simply about its use, on which there was widespread agreement, but about how to prevent its deployment. The distinction between proponents and opponents of the new weapon could not rest solely on whether they accepted or refused to sign an international treaty banning its use. Whomever shall sign the ban but would deny the mechanisms to enforce it, shall become the most effective proponents of the atomic bomb. Adequate means must be indicated to enforce such a ban. The decisive criterion in assessing the sincerity of such commitments lays in whether the ban must be operated within the confines of absolute state sovereignty or required states to renounce part of that sovereignty. In the former case, the solemn proclamation of a ban on the use of the atomic bomb would be mere utopia, as demonstrated by historical precedents. Indeed bans did not prevent Germany from rearming after World War. Nor, were there international controls capable to prevent a sovereign state from pursuing its own interests. Einaudi proposed the transferring of ownership and control of all resources and infrastructure necessary for atomic bomb production to an international authority, a sort of super-state functioning on the limited-purpose which would hold exclusive control over raw materials and mineral deposits critical to the manufacturing of nuclear weapons.

Regarding peace, Einaudi argued it was not enough proclaiming "we want peace" in public demonstrations. Instead he urged each one wonder how achieve it. He drew a parallel between domestic and international societies; within states, the establishment of judges and law enforcement officers—along with the renunciation of self-defence—had enabled individuals to protect themselves from criminals. Similarly, in international society, only a force superior to that of individual nations can prevent the outbreak of war. Those who desire peace must desire a federation that is the establishment of a higher authority capable of transcending the sovereignty of individual states.

5. The Limits of the League of Nations and the United Nations

Einaudi’s critique of absolute sovereignty provided a framework to outline the shortcomings and predict the eventual failure of both the League of Nations and the United Nations. Central to his analysis was the distinction between a federation—characterised by the limitation of state sovereignty and the establishment of a new authority to which specific powers of the federated states are to be ceded—and a confederation, which would involve intergovernmental cooperation among sovereign states without the delegation of authority to shared institutions. The League of Nations, Einaudi observed, was conceived as an alliance of independent and sovereign states committed to preserving harmony among their members and defending against external aggression. Crucially, no one considered that the achievement of such goals required the creation of a super-state with direct sovereignty over individuals, the capacity to levy taxes, maintain a supranational army, or administer its own affairs. While a League of Nations was desired, the independence of each state remained sacrosanct. In early 1918, Einaudi published an article that shocked many and provoked widespread criticism, in which he dismissed the League of Nations as a superficial construct—a mere name devoid of substance and, worse, a potential catalyst for increased conflict. He contrasted the ineffectual Society of Nations headquartered in Geneva with a genuine federation equipped with limited but real powers (see La Società delle Nazioni è un ideale possibile? - Is the League of Nations a Possible Ideal?).

After the establishment of the United Nations, Einaudi revisited the points he had already raised in 1918. He critizised the new organisation and demonstrated its inability to fulfill its stated mission of ensuring peace. While acknowledging its moral value and considering that perhaps nothing more could be done, he conceded that it might reduce the frequency of wars, he lamented its failure to create a legal framework capable of eradicating conflict. Like the Versailles Treaty before it, the San Francisco Charter, he argued, fell short due to its failure to curtail absolute state sovereignty. The new organisation lacked the necessary authority to prevent wars. Einaudi noted the promising preamble of the UN Charter, which opened with the words “We the peoples of the United Nations”, mirroring the phrasing of the American Constitution of 1787. This wording suggested that the Charter was intended as a covenant among peoples, rather than governments, implying a direct emanation from the people themselves. Despite the promising preamble and the enumeration of the noble purposes of peace, progress and civilisation that the United Nations pledged to pursue, the conclusion of the preamble gave way to disappointment: “Therefore our respective governments…”. The pact, he observed, was not an agreement among peoples but a treaty between sovereign states, grounded in the principle of their equal sovereignty. Einaudi concluded his reflections on the UN’s creation with the sombre remark: “We are at the limit of the problem of peace. The solution has not come.”

Einaudi’s confirmed the legal than moral root of his pacifism. The path to peace, in his view, was not through goodwill, societal transformation, or religious renewal, but through the establishment of a “juridical mechanism” to suppress war—namely, a federation (see Il problema della pace - The Peace Problem).

Einaudi’s critique of absolute sovereignty and his legalistic approach to peace emerged from his advocacy for European unification as a historical necessity. For Einaudi, European integration was essential not only for the continent’s progress but also as a safeguard against future conflicts. This conviction informed his interpretation of the causes and consequences of the world wars.

6. The Interpretation of the World Wars

Einaudi viewed the world wars as a manifestation of the historical necessity for European unification—a violent and tragic endeavour towards the establishment of superior state entities, driven by the integrative forces unleashed by advances in production processes and the expansion of international trade. Economic interdependence stood in direct opposition to the persistence of closed and protectionist nation-states. Consequently, some nations had no choice but to conquer by force their living space as a logical and fatal consequence of the doctrine of absolute sovereignty. Thus, the world wars turned out to be an attempt to unify Europe through violence — an aberrant response to the crisis of the nation-state and the imperative for market integration. Einaudi argued that figures such as Wilhelm II and Hitler were products of this historical necessity: the imperative for European unification. He emphasised that the problem they sought to address could not be resolved through confederal arrangements or quasi-corporate structures, as such models perpetuated the principle of state sovereignty and failed to eliminate the root causes of war. Employing a biblical metaphor, Einaudi posited that Europe’s dilemma could be addressed in only two ways: either through the “sword of Satan”— with Hitler wielding the sword of hegemony—or the “sword of God,” signifying a federation achieved through the voluntary consent of the peoples. Should a federation fail to materialise, Einaudi warned, Europe would continue to be ravaged by successive conflicts until its integration would be forcibly realised by historical necessity. Following the Second World War, he contended that the task was not to re-establish a tenuous balance of power, as attempted after previous wars, but to confront the crisis of sovereign states directly. Europe’s political structure needed to align with the continent’s socio-economic evolution, requiring the consensual establishment of a European federation. The unity sought through military domination had to be supplanted by a voluntary union of free nations (cf. Einaudi’s speech to the Constituent Assembly on 29 July 1947 on the ratification of the peace treaty and later published under the title La guerra e l’unita europea - War and European unity).

7. The Organisation of the Federal State

In late 1943, Einaudi revisited the topic of European federation, offering his first detailed consideration of the institutional structure of a federal state. He argued that such a federation had to be primarily rooted in economic grounds, reflecting the modern realities of global economic unification as a step forward vis-à-vis national markets which had been downsized to restricted spaces. The "philosophy of scarcity" inherent to small, protectionist states ought to be replaced with the "philosophy of abundance" characteristic of larger political and economic entities. Within a federation, the detrimental effects of protectionist policies—erroneous in any context given the global scope of markets by now—would be mitigated by the expansive economic space overflowing the restricted national borders. Goods and services would circulate freely, competition would be better ensured, and monopolistic practices would be more difficult to sustain. Einaudi enumerated the minimum competencies that member states would need to delegate to the federation to ensure its effective functioning: domestic trade; transport, to eliminate discriminatory practices for both travellers and freight; internal migration, to secure freedom of movement and residence; communication systems, including postal services, telephones, and telegraphs, to facilitate unhindered communication; and, finally, monetary policy, the most significant and limiting competence to the sovereignty of the states. The federation would establish stable legal relationships between currencies and create a central bank of issue, tasked with managing public expenditure, controlling inflation, and preventing protectionist measures. In summary, the federation would oversee monetary policy, freedom of movement, customs, and security.

To achieve these objectives, Einaudi contended, the federal administration must be equipped with robust instruments. Foremost among these was a common army, composed of individually recruited soldiers rather than national contingents; police functions would remain under the control of individual member states. Without an independent military force, Einaudi warned, the federation would amount to nothing more than a nominal entity, akin to the ineffective League of Nations. The right to declare war would thus be transferred from individual states to the federation though pulling off the ultimate expression of sovereignty. Given its authority over defence and foreign trade, the federation would also require diplomatic representation for matters within its purview. However, the federated states would retain their own diplomatic and consular representatives for all other areas of governance. The federation shall detain a federal judiciary power with a supreme court and a federal police force to enforce federal laws. The legislative framework shall consist of a bicameral parliament composed of a Council of States with an equal representation from each member country, while the second, the Legislative Council, shall be directly elected by citizens in proportion to population. Both chambers would share legislative power, and any law would require approval from both bodies. Executive authority would rest with the federal council (terminology is clearly inspired by the Swiss model) elected in joint session by the federal parliament.

After outlining the tasks and instruments of the federation, Einaudi turned his attention to its financial support. Consistent with his deeply held conviction, shaped by the American experience—he often cited Alexander Hamilton's observation that in political societies power without the authority to levy taxes is merely a nominal concept — Einaudi asserted that any viable political entity must sustain itself through its own resources rather than relying on external contributions. He identified customs duties as the most apparent source to be exclusively allocated to the federal revenue. Additionally, taxes on manufacturing and income generated from federally managed services would be fully allocated to the federal state. Should these resources prove insufficient, the federation could impose an income tax directly on its citizens. A true federal state is thus outlined, capable of guaranteeing both a single market and internal peace, with a single customs jurisdiction, a common army, independent financial resources, and unified legislative, executive, and judicial powers (cf. Per una federazione economica europea and I problemi economici della federazione europea - For a European Economic Federation and The Economic Problems of the European Federation).

By 1950, European unification had begun to take shape through the functionalist approach, as epitomised by the Monnet Memorandum. The Schuman Declaration of 9 May launched the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community. On 27 June, Einaudi recorded his observations on the Schuman Plan to advocate the adoption of majority voting as a fundamental principle for proper functioning. He also stressed that the High Authority should be empowered to issue directives directly to economic entities, regardless of their location within national territories, without requiring ratification by individual states. Einaudi warned that unanimity in decision-making would duplicate the stance of the League of Nations, the United Nations Organisation, or the Council of Europe—bodies he viewed as lacking substantive power (cf. On the Schuman Plan).

8. The Critique of Functionalism

Having clarified the necessity of unification and the federal state model, Einaudi turned to the question of how such unification could be achieved. During the First World War, he expressed an interest in the functionalist method. Einaudi acknowledged that the sentiments of nationality, respect for traditions, and national diversity were so deeply entrenched that the immediate establishment of a European federation was unfeasible. He deemed it inconceivable to ask nations, particularly those of Central and Eastern Europe that had only recently secured their independence through war, to relinquish their hard-won sovereignty. What, then, was to be done? Einaudi sought a pragmatic path in the functionalist approach implemented with the League of Nations. He proposed that rather than attempting to construct an abstract legal framework that would be difficult to impose on diverse nations, circumscribed powers should be gradually transferred to common institutions tasked with governing specific domains. In his 1919 essay La società delle Nazioni e il governo delle cose (The League of Nations and the Government of Things), Einaudi outlined a distinction between the governance of men, which pertains to political decisions affecting conflicting interests of individuals and regions, and the administration of things, which involves technical matters such as managing water resources or delivering postal services. Einaudi drew inspiration from the Universal Postal Union, which had continued to operate effectively even during wartime. He described it as a tangible example of a functional League of Nations, wherein states had delegated a portion of their sovereignty to a shared authority. The international organisation envisaged by Wilson would stand a greater chance of success if, rather than setting the ambitious and challenging goal of preventing wars, it confined itself to addressing technical, inter-state issues such as the management of rivers, lakes, canals, postal services, and public health. By focusing on the administration of things, over time the organisation could get to governing men, and evolve into a robust and dynamic superstate, capable of guaranteeing peace. Whereas a League of Nations designed to arbitrate between sovereign states and prevent wars was destined to remain an illusory concept.

The functionalist model, later adopted by Monnet for the creation of European communities, took shape in Einaudi’s vision as follows: the delegation of sovereignty in specific technical sectors to supranational institutions for the coordinated management of shared challenges. Over time, these unions, initially addressed to the “government of things,” would consolidate and expand their scope ultimately evolving into a superstate capable of the “government of men.”

While adopting a functionalist perspective, Einaudi steadfastly maintained that the League of Nations, even if limited to governing technical matters, should have collected its own independent sources of revenue. Regardless of its remit, the League would inevitably incur expenses, necessitating a reliable financial foundation. But what sources of funding could it draw upon? Einaudi identified two possible systems: contributions from member states or revenues derived directly from the League’s own resources. The first and the secondo methods positioned individual states and citizens respectively as contributors. The contribution-based system appears more straightforward, as it preserves the prevailing order, respects state sovereignty, and does not impinge upon national independence. It obviates the need for a supranational tax system, ensuring that taxpayers do not perceive an additional burden. However, as this method does not curtail state sovereignty, it sacrifices efficacy. The flaw of this methods lies not only in the States being often reluctant to relinquish sovereignty or adequately fund the League, but also in the perennial rivalry between nations which makes contribution payment a thorny and contentious issue. Whether contributions are allocated based on territory, population, or national income, dissatisfaction is inevitable. Some states would challenge the criteria, delay their payments, or fail to pay altogether.

In contrast, funding through the League’s own resources presents challenges only at the outset, requiring a one-time relinquishment of a particular revenue stream (e.g., customs duties) to the League. This initial sacrifice is offset by reduced national expenditure in areas transferred to the League’s competence. Once established, the League’s tax mechanism would operate independently, free from dependence on member states. The League should not claim arrear payments from default countries not would there be disputes over national shares.

Einaudi revisited the question of achieving a European federation after the Second World War, adopting a more critical stance towards the functionalist approach. He highlighted the inconsistencies that functional European Communities were likely to encounter. Historically, international unions, such as the Red Cross, the Universal Postal Union, and unions for the protection of industrial property, trademarks, and literary rights, have been successfully managed by technical experts, limiting state sovereignty to a minimal extent. Inspired by these successes, the principle could be extended to broader domains, resulting in organisations like the International Monetary Fund, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Defence Community (EDC). While Einaudi acknowledged these efforts as expressions of goodwill, he cautioned that they should not become ends in themselves. Instead, they should serve as transitional steps towards the ultimate goal of political federation within a clearly defined timeframe. Einaudi rejected the notion that spontaneous evolution from technical or sectoral integration would naturally lead to political unification. While gradualism might have its merits, it must involve a clearly articulated roadmap toward political union, with intermediate stages explicitly delineated and the ultimate objective firmly established at the outset.

Einaudi further observed that while earlier international unions addressed technical and narrowly defined issues, the newer organisations, such as the ECSC and the EDC, tackled the vital interests of their member states. For these entities to function effectively, they would inevitably need to engage with the economic and social fabric of the states involved. As such, they would require not only genuine governance but also a legitimate parliamentary structure.

Einaudi endeavours to envision the practical implications of functionalism. He suggests that while new unions might succeed if their sole objective were to remove barriers to free trade, they are destined to fail if they venture into political decision-making that inevitably affects the divergent interests of various social and economic groups. For instance, should the “black” coal-dominated state seek not only to liberalise trade but also to regulate coal and steel prices, allocate production geographically, and oversee trade, its policies would inevitably conflict with the agrarian interests of the green state, which would suffer under the fuel and machinery prices imposed by the black state. Both would, in turn, find themselves at odds with the “defence" state—the most influential functional entity—due to the financial strain caused by the competing demands of the two other states for resources such as food and armaments. Einaudi concluded that fragmenting governance across such functional entities is unworkable. A conventional alliance, he argued, would be preferable as its durability would inherently be tied to the mutual interests of its members to stay united. The concept of a functional federation reflects a profound intellectual confusion; those who advocate for a shared army must logically embrace the broader framework of a political federation. Partial unions such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the green pool, and the European Defence Community (EDC) can only be accepted as transitional measures, as a middle step toward the ultimate goal of full political unification. A customs union without a monetary union is nonsensical, and monetary union cannot be achieved without relinquishing control over currency issuance and a substantial portion of political sovereignty. He insists, “It is a grave error to claim that one can begin with the seemingly simpler economic aspects and later progress to the more complex political outcome. The reverse is true: political union must come first if economic integration is the final target”. Einaudi underscored the critical importance of establishing the European Defence Community. A common army is the indispensable foundation of a federation, as no European state can ensure its security in isolation. The existential anxiety gripping Europeans is the same as Machiavelli’s lament over the impotence of Italian city-states in the face of French and Spanish dominance, and it is the anguish that afflicts Italians, French, and Germans as they confront the geopolitical titans of East and West. The creation of a common army, therefore, represents not only a safeguard of Europe’s independence condemned, it division remains, to a conditions of vassalage to the United States and the Soviet Union (cf. Tipi e connotati della federazione - Types and Connotations of Federation).

1. Conclusions

Einaudi’s contributions to the cause of European unification were primarily theoretical. He articulated the necessity of integration with intellectual depth and made original additions to federalist thought. However, his influence in this sphere pales in comparison to his active engagement in Italian domestic politics. Unlike contemporaries such as Rossi and Spinelli, Einaudi lacked the resolve to transform his theoretical insights into practical initiatives. From as early as 1897, he championed the unity of Europe and eloquently demonstrated its necessity, yet he refrained from dedicating himself to its tangible realisation. This is the essence of Einaudi’s paradox: while he wrote prolifically, advocated, and disseminated the concept of European unity, and even supported the European Federalist Movement both personally and financially, his direct involvement in its execution is largely absent. He remains unmentioned in the autobiographies of other eminent pro-European figures of his era as an active agent of European integration.

Einaudi was more a theorist of European integration than a politician driving its enactment. Although he provided substantial contributions to federalist ideology grounded in his liberal worldview, he did not conceive federalism as an independent ideology with unique values or novel conceptual frameworks capable of producing an original reimagining of society and power able to feed a political movement independent from political parties and serving as its vehicle for achieving traditional liberal or socialist ideals. His cultural horizon about political and economic organization of society remained based on liberty; federalism thus became ancillary vis-à-vis liberalism required to ensure the full implementation of ideals of liberty by means of federalism, the abolishment customs barriers, unification of markets, a sound monetary governance, stabilisation of exchange rates, and guarantee of peace.

Nonetheless, Einaudi must be regarded as one of the principal architects of 20th-century federalist thought. His intellectual contributions stand out particularly when contrasted with the inability of many contemporary Italian intellectuals—Gobetti, Gramsci, and Croce among them—to discern the transformative implications of their era. These figures failed to perceive the nation-state’s crisis or to seek alternative frameworks for interpreting fascism and the broader history of the 20th century. Most Italian intellectuals missed the connection between domestic issues and the international context in which they were unfolding, and the perception that the actual solution to these problems had to be sought beyond national borders, beyond the national state moulded by the French revolution. He had the ability to clearly see the fundamental historical problem of the 20th century: the overcoming of the national state towards European and world unification.

Einaudi, by contrast, transcended the limitations of a purely national perspective, adopting a supranational lens through which to interpret history. He identified the central historical challenge of the 20th century: the need to overcome the sovereign nation-state and advance toward European and global unification. He was acutely aware of Europe’s autonomy in the face of superpowers and rejected the continent’s potential relegation to a state of vassalage. For Einaudi, only the establishment of a European federation—not reliance on American protection—could ensure security and prosperity for European citizens, addressing needs that the nation-states were increasingly unable to meet.

Einaudi felt a deep sense of independence of Europe against superpowers, nor was he ready to accept the undermining of the continent to a conditions of servitude which would actually be averted with the establishment of a European federation. Union only, and not American protection, could guarantee European citizens what the nation states were no longer able to provide: security and prosperity. And the time to achieve union was not infinite, as he recalled on 1 March 1954, at the time of the EDC ratification, in his last pro-European writing, in which he defined the national states as ‘dust without substance’.